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Abstract: Suppose that we have access to a finite set of expenditure data drawn from
an individual consumer, i.e., how much of each good has been purchased and at what
prices. Afriat (1967) was the first to establish necessary and sufficient conditions on
such a data set for rationalizability by utility maximization. In this note, we provide
a new and simple proof of Afriat’s Theorem, the explicit steps of which help to more
deeply understand the driving force behind one of the more curious features of the
result itself, namely that a concave rationalization is without loss of generality in a
classical finite data setting. Our proof stresses the importance of the non-uniqueness
of a utility representation along with the finiteness of the data set in ensuring the
existence of a concave utility function that rationalizes the data.
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Suppose that we have access to a finite set of expenditure data drawn from an individual
consumer, i.e., how much of each good has been purchased and at what prices. When is
such a consumer’s behavior consistent with the maximization of a stable preference over con-
sumption goods? Afriat (1967) was the first to establish necessary and sufficient conditions
on a finite set of price and demand observations in order to provide a definitive answer to
this question. In this note, we provide a new and simple proof of Afriat’s Theorem, the
explicit steps of which help to more deeply understand the driving force behind one of the
more curious features of the result itself, namely that a concave rationalization is without
loss of generality in a classical finite data setting.
Formally, let D = (pt, xt)t∈T be a finite data set, where xt = (xt1, xt2, . . . , xt`) ≥ 0 denotes
the consumption of ` goods purchased at prices pt = (pt1, p
t
2, . . . , p
t
`)  0. The data set
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D = (pt, xt)t∈T is said to be rationalizable if there exists a preference relation <∗ on R`+,
which is complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated, such that, at every observation t ∈
T , xt <∗ x for any x ∈ Bt := {x ∈ R`+ : pt · x ≤ pt · xt}. In words, a data set is
rationalizable if we are unable to reject the hypothesis that a consumer has consistently
chosen a preferred option from the set of feasible alternatives. It is worth stressing that we
require the consumer’s preference to be stable, i.e., unchanging across observations.
Theorem 1 (Afriat’s Theorem). The following statements are equivalent:
(1) The data set D = (pt, xt)t∈T is rationalizable.
(2) Given the data set D = (pt, xt)t∈T , there exists (vt, λt)t∈T , with (vt, λt) ∈ R× R++ for
all t ∈ T , such that
vt
′ ≤ vt + λtpt · (xt′ − xt) for any (t, t′) ∈ T × T. (Afriat inequalities)
(3) There exists a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave utility function v : R`+ → R,
such that, at every observation t ∈ T , xt ∈ arg maxx∈Bt v(x).
For seminal statements and proofs of Afriat’s Theorem, see Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973),
and Varian (1982); for the relationship between our approach and the broader literature, we
refer the reader to the discussion which immediately follows the proof. Before formally
proving Theorem 1, we emphasize a number of distinctive features of our approach. Firstly,
and most importantly, our proof (in its construction) stresses the importance of the non-
uniqueness of a utility representation along with the finiteness of the data set in ensuring
the existence of a concave utility function that rationalizes the data. Secondly, like Varian’s
(1982) algorithmic proof, ours is entirely constructive; however, unlike Varian (1982), we first
construct the numbers (vt)t (interpreting v
t as the utility of consuming the bundle xt) and
then the numbers (λt)t (interpreting λ
t as the shadow value of the expenditure pt ·xt). Lastly,
most renditions of Afriat’s Theorem typically incorporate a further equivalent statement,
namely that the data set obeys an intuitive no-cycling condition known as the generalized
axiom of revealed preference (GARP);1 we omit this statement of the theorem as our proof
does not appeal to GARP.
1 A typical route to proving the theorem is to first show that rationalizability implies GARP, subsequently
that GARP implies the Afriat inequalities, and finally that the Afriat inequalities imply rationalizability.
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We first prove that (1) =⇒ (2), i.e., the necessity of the Afriat inequalities for ratio-
nalizability by a complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated preference relation, in three
distinct lemmas. Throughout, let X := {xt : t ∈ T} denote the finite set of observed con-
sumption bundles. By convention, the infimum (resp., supremum) of the empty set is +∞
(resp., −∞), r/0 = +∞ for any r > 0, and R := R ∪ {−∞,+∞} is the extended real line.
Lemma 1. If the data set D = (pt, xt)t∈T is rationalizable, then there exists a complete and
transitive preference relation < ⊆ X × X , such that
xt
′ < xt =⇒ pt · (xt′ − xt) ≥ 0 for any (t, t′) ∈ T × T, (i)
xt
′  xt =⇒ pt · (xt′ − xt) > 0 for any (t, t′) ∈ T × T. (ii)
Condition (i) states that if xt
′
is weakly preferred to xt, then xt
′
must cost at least as
much as xt when xt is purchased; condition (ii) states that if xt
′
is strictly preferred to xt,
then xt
′
must cost strictly more than xt when xt is purchased.2
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume the data set D = (pt, xt)t∈T is rationalizable by the complete,
transitive, and locally non-satiated preference relation <∗. (a) Suppose that there exists
some (t, t′) such that xt
′ <∗ xt and pt · (xt′ − xt) < 0. By the completeness and local non-
satiation of <∗, there exists some ε > 0 and some x in the open ball of radius ε around xt′
such that pt · x ≤ pt · xt and x ∗ xt′ . By the transitivity of <∗, x ∗ xt′ and xt′ <∗ xt imply
that x ∗ xt, contradicting the optimality of xt. (b) Suppose that there exists some (t, t′)
such that xt
′ ∗ xt and pt · (xt′ −xt) ≤ 0. This immediately contradicts the optimality of xt.
It follows from (a) and (b) that (i) and (ii) hold, with < the restriction of <∗ to X ×X .
We now apply Lemma 1 in order to construct a specific utility representation of <. A set
of real numbers (vt)t∈T is said to represent the preference relation < if vt ≥ vt′ ⇐⇒ xt < xt′
for any (t, t′) ∈ T × T .
2 It is not uncommon to equivalently represent conditions (i) and (ii) using their contrapositives, i.e.,
(i′) pt · (xt′ − xt) < 0 =⇒ xt  xt′ for any (t, t′) ∈ T × T , and (ii′) pt · (xt′ − xt) ≤ 0 =⇒ xt <
xt
′
for any (t, t′) ∈ T ×T . Condition (ii′) states that if xt′ is affordable when xt is purchased, then xt must
be weakly preferred to xt
′
; condition (i′) states that if xt
′
costs strictly less that xt when xt is purchased,
then xt must be strictly preferred to xt
′
. Conditions (i) and (ii) are similar to the conditions in Varian
(1984) for cost minimization.
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Lemma 2. Given the data set D = (pt, xt)t∈T , if there exists a complete and transitive
preference relation < ⊆ X ×X , such that (i) and (ii) hold, then there exists a representation
(vt)t∈T of <, such that
vt
′ − vt
vt − vt′′ ≤
pt · (xt′ − xt)
pt · (xt − xt′′) , (iii)
for all triplets (t′, t, t′′) ∈ T × T × T satisfying xt′  xt  xt′′ and pt · (xt − xt′′) ≥ 0.
To understand condition (iii), consider any function v that rationalizes the data, and
suppose that for some (t′, t, t′′) satisfying v(xt
′
) > v(xt) > v(xt
′′
) and pt · (xt − xt′′) ≥ 0,
v(xt
′
)− v(xt)
v(xt)− v(xt′′) >
pt · (xt′ − xt)
pt · (xt − xt′′) ,
i.e., condition (iii) is violated (with v(xt) = vt, v(xt
′
) = vt
′
, and v(xt
′′
) = vt
′′
). This
statement is then equivalent to
pt · (xt − xt′′)
pt · (xt′ − xt) + pt · (xt − xt′′)v(x
t′) +
pt · (xt′ − xt)
pt · (xt′ − xt) + pt · (xt − xt′′)v(x
t′′) > v(xt),
i.e., a convex combination of v(xt
′
) and v(xt
′′
) is strictly greater than v(xt) (recall that
pt · (xt′ − xt) > 0 since v(xt′) > v(xt); see Lemma 1). Moreover, notice that the bundle
yt :=
pt · (xt − xt′′)
pt · (xt′ − xt) + pt · (xt − xt′′)x
t′ +
pt · (xt′ − xt)
pt · (xt′ − xt) + pt · (xt − xt′′)x
t′′
exhausts the budget at prices pt, i.e., pt · yt = pt · xt. Since v rationalizes the data set, it
must be that v(xt) ≥ v(yt). Combining this inequality with the above inequality, it follows
that v cannot be concave. Therefore, condition (iii) is essential in ensuring the existence
of a concave rationalization. It is worth stressing that the existence of a representation
satisfying condition (iii) rests heavily on non-uniqueness properties. If the representation
was unique up to an affine transformation, condition (iii) would not necessarily hold. Indeed,
if v rationalizes the data but fails condition (iii), then any affine transformation αv+β, with
(α, β) ∈ R++ ×R, would also violate condition (iii) since the ratios remain unchanged, i.e.,
v(xt
′
)− v(xt)
v(xt)− v(xt′′) =
(αv(xt
′
) + β)− (αv(xt) + β)
(αv(xt) + β)− (αv(xt′′) + β) ,
for any (xt
′
, xt, xt
′′
). For instance, in the domain of risk, the expected utility representation
is unique (up to an affine transformation),3 and concavity of the Bernoulli function is not
3 By uniqueness up to an affine transformation, we mean uniqueness within the class of expected utility
representations.
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without loss of generality, as demonstrated by Polisson, Quah, and Renou (2015). (See also
the examples under uncertainty in Bayer et al. (2013) and Echenique and Saito (2015).)
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the preference relation < is complete and transitive, there exists
a partition {T0, T1, . . . , Tn} of T such that xt  xt′ for all (t, t′) ∈ Ti × Tj with i > j, and
xt ∼ xt′ for all (t, t′) ∈ Ti × Ti, i.e., we can partition the set of observations into equivalence
classes, ordered from the worst to the best. By the finiteness of X , a representation (vt)t∈T
of < exists. Since there is nothing to prove if T\(T0∪Tn) = ∅, assume that T\(T0∪Tn) 6= ∅.
For all t ∈ T , define the sets U t := {t′ ∈ T : xt′  xt} and Lt := {t′′ ∈ T : xt 
xt
′′
and pt · (xt − xt′′) ≥ 0}. For every t ∈ T\(T0 ∪ Tn), let
mt = inf
(t′,t′′)∈Ut×Lt
pt · (xt′ − xt)
pt · (xt − xt′′) .
By construction, mt > 0 for all t ∈ T\(T0 ∪ Tn), so that inft∈T\(T0∪Tn) mt > 0. Choose any
m∗ ∈ (0, inft∈T\(T0∪Tn) mt]\{+∞}, where (0, inft∈T\(T0∪Tn) mt] can be viewed as a half-open
interval on the extended real line R.
Let vt = 0 for all t ∈ T0 and vt =
∑i
j=1(m
∗/(m∗ + 1))j for all t ∈ Ti, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Clearly, (vt)t∈T is a representation of <. We now argue that (vt)t∈T is also a representation
of < which satisfies condition (iii). Choose any triplet (t′, t, t′′) ∈ T × T × T satisfying
xt
′  xt  xt′′ and pt · (xt − xt′′) ≥ 0. Assume that t′ ∈ Ti′ , t ∈ Ti, and t′′ ∈ Ti′′ , with
i′ > i > i′′ ≥ 1. (If i′′ = 0, a similar argument applies.) We have that
vt
′ − vt
vt − vt′′ =
∑i′
j=1
(
m∗
m∗+1
)j −∑ij=1 ( m∗m∗+1)j∑i
j=1
(
m∗
m∗+1
)j −∑i′′j=1 ( m∗m∗+1)j =
∑i′
j=i+1
(
m∗
m∗+1
)j∑i
j=i′′+1
(
m∗
m∗+1
)j
≤
∑i′
j=i+1
(
m∗
m∗+1
)j(
m∗
m∗+1
)i = i′∑
j=i+1
(
m∗
m∗ + 1
)j−i
≤ lim
i′→∞
i′∑
j=i+1
(
m∗
m∗ + 1
)j−i
= m∗,
where the inequalities follow from the fact that we are summing over positive terms and∑i
j=i′′+1
(
m∗
m∗+1
)j ≥ ( m∗
m∗+1
)i
> 0. Finally, by construction, we have that
m∗ ≤ mt ≤ p
t · (xt′ − xt)
pt · (xt − xt′′) ,
which completes the argument.
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We now apply Lemmas 1 and 2 in order to construct multipliers, thereby completing
the proof that the Afriat inequalities are a necessary condition for rationalizability by a
complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated preference relation.
Lemma 3. Given the data set D = (pt, xt)t∈T , if there exists a representation (vt)t∈T ,
satisfying (iii), of the complete and transitive preference relation < ⊆ X ×X , satisfying (i)
and (ii), then there exists (λt)t∈T , with λt ∈ R++ for all t ∈ T , such that
vt
′ ≤ vt + λtpt · (xt′ − xt) for all (t, t′) ∈ T × T. (Afriat inequalities)
Proof of Lemma 3. For every t ∈ T , consider the interval
I t :=
[
sup
t′∈Ut
vt
′ − vt
pt · (xt′ − xt) , inft′′∈Lt
vt − vt′′
pt · (xt − xt′′)
]
⊆ R.
By the definition of Lt, we have that
inf
t′′∈Lt
vt − vt′′
pt · (xt − xt′′) > 0,
for all t ∈ T . From Lemma 2, we have that
inf
t′′∈Lt
vt − vt′′
pt · (xt − xt′′) ≥ supt′∈Ut
vt
′ − vt
pt · (xt′ − xt) ,
for all t ∈ T such that U t × Lt 6= ∅. It then follows that I t ∩ R++ 6= ∅ for all t ∈ T . Choose
any λt ∈ I t ∩ R++ for all t ∈ T .
We now verify that (vt, λt)t∈T as constructed does indeed satisfy the Afriat inequalities.
For any t ∈ T , there are three cases to consider. Firstly, choose any t′′ ∈ T such that
vt > vt
′′
. If pt · (xt′′ − xt) < 0, then
vt + λtpt · (xt′′ − xt) ≥ vt + v
t − vt′′
pt · (xt − xt′′)p
t · (xt′′ − xt) ≥ vt′′ ,
since 0 < λt ≤ (vt − vt′′)/pt · (xt − xt′′). Similarly, if pt · (xt′′ − xt) ≥ 0, then
vt + λtpt · (xt′′ − xt) ≥ vt′′ ,
since λt > 0. Secondly, choose any t′ ∈ T such that vt′ > vt. We have that
vt + λtpt · (xt′ − xt) ≥ vt + v
t′ − vt
pt · (xt′ − xt)p
t · (xt′ − xt) ≥ vt′ ,
since λt ≥ (vt′ − vt)/pt · (xt′ − xt) > 0 and pt · (xt′ − xt) > 0. Thirdly, choose any t∗ such
that vt = vt
∗
(hence, xt ∼ xt∗). Lemma 1 guarantees that λtpt · (xt∗ − xt) ≥ 0, and therefore
vt + λtpt · (xt∗ − xt) ≥ vt∗ since λt > 0. This completes the proof.
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Figure 1: Example
In the progression from Lemmas 1 to 3, we have proven that the Afriat inequalities are
a necessary condition for rationalizability by a complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated
preference relation. To further illustrate the mechanics of our construction, consider the
following numerical example.4 Suppose that a consumer is observed to have chosen the
bundle x1 = (4, 1) at the prices p1 = (1, 2), x2 = (2, 2) at p2 = (2, 2), and x3 = (2, 1) at
p3 = (2, 1). This scenario is depicted in Figure 1.
Suppose that a complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated preference relation <∗ ratio-
nalizes the data, with x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3. Since p2 · (x1−x2) = 2 > 0, p3 · (x1−x3) = 4 > 0, and
p3 · (x2− x3) = 1 > 0, Lemma 1 is satisfied, with < the restriction of <∗ to X ×X . Turning
to Lemma 2, we have T0 = {3}, T1 = {2}, and T2 = {1}; U1 = ∅, U2 = {1}, and U3 = {1, 2};
L1 = {2, 3}, L2 = {3}, and L3 = ∅. It follows that m2 = p2 · (x1 − x2)/p2 · (x2 − x3) = 1.
Letting m∗ = m2 = 1, the numbers v3 = 0, v2 = 1/2, and v1 = 3/4 satisfy Lemma 2.5 Turn-
ing to Lemma 3, we have I1 = (−∞, 3/8], I2 = [1/8, 1/4], and I3 = [1/2,+∞). Choosing
λ1 = 1/8, λ2 = 1/4, and λ3 = 1/2, the set (vt, λt)t=1,2,3 satisfies the Afriat inequalities.
As a final step, we prove that (2) =⇒ (3), i.e., the sufficiency of the Afriat inequalities
4 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for providing this example.
5 Suppose the consumer had chosen x˜3 = (1, 3) instead of x3 = (2, 1). In this case, p2 · (x2−x3) = 0, and
therefore m2 = +∞. Following Lemma 2, we are free to choose any m∗ ∈ (0,+∞), e.g., m∗ = 1.
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for rationalizability by a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave utility function.
Lemma 4. If there exists (vt, λt)t∈T , with each (vt, λt) ∈ R×R++ for all t ∈ T , that satisfies
the Afriat inequalities, then there exists a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave utility
function v : R`+ → R, such that xt ∈ arg maxx∈Bt v(x) for all t ∈ T .
Proof of Lemma 4. This proof is not new, but we provide it for completeness.6 Let the
utility function v : R`+ → R be defined by v(x) = inf {vt + λtpt · (x − xt) : t ∈ T} for any
x ∈ R`+. Notice that the piecewise linear utility function v is continuous, strictly increasing,
and concave. By the definition of v, for all t ∈ T , v(xt) = vt∗ + λt∗pt∗ · (xt − xt∗) ≤
vt + λtpt · (xt − xt) = vt for some t∗ ∈ T , and if this inequality were to hold strictly, then
the Afriat inequalities would be violated. Therefore, v(xt) = vt for all t ∈ T . Now, at any
t ∈ T , choose some x ∈ Bt = {x ∈ R`+ : pt · x ≤ pt · xt}. Again by the definition of v, for this
t ∈ T and x ∈ Bt, v(x) ≤ vt + λtpt · (x− xt). Since x ∈ Bt, pt · (x− xt) ≤ 0, and therefore
v(x) ≤ vt. Finally, using that v(xt) = vt for all t ∈ T , we have v(x) ≤ vt = v(xt).
Since rationalization by a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave utility function
clearly implies rationalization by a complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated preference
relation, we have shown an equivalence between (1), (2), and (3), and the proof of Afriat’s
Theorem is therefore complete.
Some background and concluding remarks are helpful to situate the main insights of
our approach. Afriat’s Theorem was initially stated and proven by Afriat (1967) using a
combinatorial inductive approach. Several years later, the result was simplified, qualified,
and extended by Diewert (1973), who related the theorem more directly to a specific linear
programming problem, and by Varian (1982), who more explicitly linked GARP to the cycli-
cal consistency property of Afriat (1967), and who generally promoted the broad approach
as a nonparametric alternative to demand analysis. More recently, Fostel, Scarf, and Todd
(2004) provided two new proofs of Afriat’s Theorem, one inductive and another exploiting
the dual structure inherent in linear programming problems.
Several extensions and adaptations to the Afriat (1967) approach have proven insightful
and useful over the years. Matzkin (1991), Chavas and Cox (1993), Forges and Minelli (2009),
6 It first appears in Afriat (1967), then Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982), among many others.
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and Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2014) provided complete characterizations under
more general (not necessarily linear) constraints. Teo and Vohra (2003) showed that ratio-
nalizability is related to the identification of cycles in graphs, and Geanakoplos (2013) linked
rationalizability to the existence of equilibria in zero-sum games. Reny (2015) circumvented
the Afriat inequalities entirely and directly proved that GARP is necessary and sufficient for
rationalizability (in both finite and infinite data), somewhat in the spirit of Rochet (1987)
and Brown and Calsamiglia (2007). Lastly, Fujishige and Yang (2012), Polisson and Quah
(2013), Cosaert and Demuynck (2014), and Forges and Iehle´ (2014) allowed for discreteness
and indivisibilities, which is a natural consideration in many empirical applications.
Our approach delivers further clarity on a particular issue, namely that a concave ra-
tionalization is without loss of generality in a finite data setting. Firstly, let us say that
a preference relation on X is consistent with the data if it satisfies conditions (i) and (ii).
Lemma 2 then states that any preference relation on X , consistent with the data, admits a
specific representation, i.e., a representation that satisfies condition (iii). In turn, Lemma 3
states that this specific representation admits multipliers, which satisfy the Afriat inequal-
ities, and which therefore extends to a concave representation on the entire consumption
space. This observation complements a recent result of Quah (2014), who stated that any
preference relation on X , consistent with the data, extends to a concave rationalization on
the entire consumption space; in this note, we have explicitly constructed a specific repre-
sentation on X , which extends to a concave representation on the entire consumption space.
One advantage of proving the necessity of the Afriat inequalities directly (and without
appealing to GARP) is to highlight the role of non-uniqueness (up to affine transformations),
and therefore the main insight of the approach can be found in Lemma 2. As Diewert (1973)
concluded, “it is perhaps somewhat surprising that the [utility function] constructed from
a finite body of price and quantity data . . . is continuous, increasing and concave when the
decision-maker’s ‘true’ [preference] only satisfies the much weaker regularity conditions . . .
thus the data will never be able to reveal backward bending indifference curves or non-
convex indifference sets.” Diewert (1973) goes on to quote Samuelson (1950), who made
the earlier observation that “any point where the indifference curves are convex rather than
concave cannot be observed in a competitive market,” and that “such points are shrouded in
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eternal darkness.” What this note has highlighted is that the lack of uniqueness of a utility
representation in a restricted finite data setting is largely responsible for such an equivalence.
When budgets are nonlinear, however, a lack of uniqueness (say, up to affine transfor-
mations) of the representation does not necessarily guarantee the equivalence. Indeed, we
also require the ratios of utilities (vt
′ − vt)/(vt − vt′′) to be bounded from above by ra-
tios of linear functionals. To see this, let us briefly revisit the work of Forges and Minelli
(2009). In Forges and Minelli (2009), a data set is a finite collection (xt, Bt)t∈T , where
Bt := {x ∈ R`+ : gt(x) ≤ 0} is a generalized budget set (for all t ∈ T , gt : R`+ → R is a con-
tinuous and increasing function satisfying gt(xt) = 0). Assume that the data set (xt, Bt)t∈T
is rationalizable. It is straightforward to verify that Lemmas 1 to 3 generalize to this richer
environment. Firstly, the generalized version of Lemma 1 states the existence of a complete
and transitive preference relation <⊆ X × X , such that xt′ < xt implies gt(xt′) ≥ 0 and
xt
′  xt implies gt(xt′) > 0 for all (t, t′) ∈ T ×T . Secondly, the generalized version of Lemma
2 states the existence of a representation (vt)t∈T , such that
vt
′ − vt
vt − vt′′ ≤
gt(xt
′
)
−gt(xt′′) ,
for all triplets (t′, t, t′′) ∈ T × T × T satisfying xt′  xt  xt′′ and gt(xt′′) ≤ 0. Thirdly, the
generalized version of Lemma 3 states the existence of a set of positive multipliers (λt)t∈T ,
such that for all (t, t′) ∈ T × T ,
vt
′ ≤ vt + λtgt(xt′).
However, this does not guarantee the existence of a concave rationalization. To guarantee
a concave rationalization, we need to find a finite collection of (normalized) hyperplanes
(Ht)t∈T , such that (a) Bt ⊆ {x ∈ R`+ : infht∈Ht ht · (x − xt) ≤ 0} for all t ∈ T , (b) for any
(t, t′) ∈ T × T , xt′  xt implies that infht∈Ht ht · (xt′ − xt) > 0, and (c)
vt
′ − vt
vt − vt′′ ≤
infht∈Ht ht · (xt′ − xt)
infht∈Ht ht · (xt − xt′′) ,
for all triplets (t′, t, t′′) ∈ T × T × T satisfying xt′  xt  xt′′ and gt(xt′′) ≤ 0 (hence,
infht∈Ht ht · (xt − xt′′) ≥ 0). Notice that when the budget sets are classically linear, we have
that Ht = {pt} for all t ∈ T . We refer the reader to Theorem 3 in Cherchye, Demuynck, and
De Rock (2014) for details.
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Finally, the approach developed in this paper may be particularly profitable outside of
a classical demand setting, i.e., when combinatorial GARP-like conditions do not straight-
forwardly exist, or when stronger assumptions on the preference relation or utility function
no longer hold without loss of generality. An important message is that as soon as further
structure on the preference ordering is introduced, e.g., some form of separability, then any
utility representation may be unique up to a more restrictive transformation than monotonic
transformation, which then precludes the flexible construction of a concave utility function
that rationalizes the data.
References
AFRIAT, S. N. (1967): “The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data,” Inter-
national Economic Review, 8(1), 67–77.
BAYER, R.-C., S. BOSE, M. POLISSON, and L. RENOU (2013): “Ambiguity Revealed,” IFS
Working Papers, W13/05.
BROWN, D. J., and C. CALSAMIGLIA (2007): “The Nonparametric Approach to Applied Wel-
fare Analysis,” Economic Theory, 31(1), 183–188.
CHAVAS, J.-P., and T. L. COX (1993): “On Generalized Revealed Preference Analysis,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 108(2), 493–506.
COSAERT, S., and T. DEMUYNCK (2015): “Revealed Preference Theory for Finite Choice
Sets,” Economic Theory, 59(1), 169-200.
CHERCHYE, L., T. DEMUYNCK, and B. DE ROCK (2014): “Revealed Preference Analysis for
Convex Rationalizations on Nonlinear Budget Sets,” Journal of Economic Theory, 152 (C),
224–236.
DIEWERT, W. E. (1973): “Afriat and Revealed Preference Theory,” Review of Economic Studies,
40(3), 419–425.
ECHENIQUE, F., AND K. SAITO (2015): “Supplement to ‘Savage in the Market’,” Econometrica
Supplemental Material, 83, http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA12273.
FOSTEL, A., H. E. SCARF, and M. J. TODD (2004): “Two New Proofs of Afriat’s Theorem,”
Economic Theory, 24(1), 211–219.
FORGES, F., and E. MINELLI (2009): “Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 144(1), 135–145.
FORGES, F., and V. IEHLE´ (2014): “Afriat’s Theorem for Indivisible Goods,” Journal of Math-
ematical Economics, 54(C), 1–6.
FUJISHIGE, S., and Z. F. YANG (2012): “On Revealed Preference and Indivisibilities,” Modern
Economy, 3(6), 752–758.
11
GEANAKOPLOS, J. D. (2013): “Afriat from MaxMin,” Economic Theory, 54(3), 443–448.
MATZKIN, R. L. (1991): “Axioms of Revealed Preference for Nonlinear Choice Sets,” Economet-
rica, 59(6), 1779–1786.
POLISSON, M., and J. K.-H. QUAH (2013): “Revealed Preference in a Discrete Consumption
Space,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(1), 28–34.
POLISSON, M., J. K.-H. QUAH, and L. RENOU (2015): “Revealed Preferences over Risk and
Uncertainty,” IFS Working Papers, W15/25.
QUAH, J. K.-H. (2014): “A Test for Weakly Separable Preferences,” Department of Economics,
University of Oxford, Discussion Paper Series, 708.
RENY, P. J. (2015): “A Characterization of Rationalizable Consumer Behavior,” Econometrica,
83(1), 175–192.
ROCHET, J.-C. (1987): “A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Rationalizability in a Quasi-
Linear Context,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16(2), 191–200.
SAMUELSON, P. A. (1950): “The Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory,” Economica, 17(68),
355–385.
TEO, C. P., and R. V. VOHRA (2003): “Afriat’s Theorem and Negative Cycles,” Center for
Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Kellogg School of Manage-
ment, Northwestern University, 1377.
VARIAN, H. R. (1982): “The Nonparametric Approach to Demand Analysis,” Econometrica,
50(4), 945–973.
VARIAN, H. R. (1984): “The Nonparametric Approach to Production Analysis,” Econometrica,
52(3), 579–598.
12
